BY SALVADOR BARBERA'
DECISION SCHEMES ARE SOCIAL decision-making procedures which assign a lottery on alternatives to each N-tuple of rankings over alternatives. A decision scheme is individual strategy-proof if no individual expected utility maximizer ever finds it advantageous to manipulate its outcome by misrepresenting his preference ranking of alternatives. Gibbard [2] has recently characterized the class of all decision schemes which meet this requirement. It is a large class; some interesting subclasses of it are studied in [1] . This note defines a stronger property of decision schemes, that of group strategy-proofness, and characterizes the class of decision schemes which satisfy this property.
The reader is referred for notation and definitions to Gibbard's work [2] . Some additional definitions are introduced below. 
u1(y) -u1(x)][d(y, P') -d(y, P)] > [ui(z) -u1(w)][d(w, P') -d(w, P)].
Notice that this choice is always possible since xPi ! y and zP; ! w. Then, individuals i and j endowed with utility scales ui and u; would find it advantageous to form a coalition and manipulate from P to P'.
THEOREM:
A decision scheme d is group strategy-proof iff it is localized, nonperverse, and either unilateral or the sum of a constant and a duple scheme.
PROOF:
The sufficiency part of the theorem is obvious. To prove necessity, suppose d is group strategy-proof. Then it is individual strategy-proof and, by Gibbard's theorem [2] , it is the sum of nonperverse and localized schemes, each of which is either unilateral or duple, in the form d = do + d1 +. . . + dm.
Assume without loss of generality that this decomposition is in reduced form. The result is trivial when the number of alternatives equals two. The following argument applies when there are at least three alternatives.
Step Since all components of the reduced decomposition of d are nonperverse and localized, the conditions of Proposition 5 would hold for P and P', contradicting the fact that d is group strategy-proof.
Step 3: The decomposition of d cannot involve at the same time two strict duple schemes. For, suppose dxy and dzw were such schemes. Since we are working with a reduced decomposition, and by (4.4), there would exist P, P, i 1 j, P' and P such that Again, application of Proposition 5 would lead to a contradiction.
Step 4: By Steps 1, 2, and 3, we know that d is group strategy-proof only if its reduced decomposition consists of at most a constant term and another term, which must in turn be localized, nonperverse, and either unilateral or duple. The fact that the sum of a constant and a unilateral scheme is unilateral completes the proof.
Finally, notice that only two-individual coalitions need to be used in the proof of the theorem. Thus, the fact that coordination of large groups of individuals for strategic purposes might be costly and/or easy to detect will not help much in dispelling the negative impact of the result presented here.
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